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I. INTRODUCTION
In establishing the first amendment rights of secondary school students,
the Supreme Court maintained, "It can hardly be argued that ... stu-
dents . . . shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate."' Concurrent with the development of student rights
has been an expanded recognition of first amendment freedoms to include the
implied reciprocal of the right to express: the right to receive! The scope of
these two relatively recent first amendment developments has become a
source of conflict when local secondary school authorities have attempted to
remove socially and politically controversial books from public school li-
braries. School board proscriptions have been countered by student first
amendment "right to know ' 4 lawsuits seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief to require the return of excluded books to the library.
5
The federal courts adjudicating this issue have been unable to agree upon
the role of the first amendment in secondary school education. Several courts
have held that the broad powers vested in local school boards permit discre-
tionary limitations on student access to controversial materials. A nearly
equal number of courts, however, have held that a social or political distaste
for the message conveyed by a book is insufficient to justify its removal and
the consequent infringement on student rights
The divergent results achieved in "school book" cases stand in sharp
contrast to the similarity of the courts' approaches to the issue. In mediating
the interests of students and school boards, courts have relied exclusively
upon an ad hoc balancing approach. Ad hoc adjudication consists of case-by-
1. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
2. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57
(1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,408-09 (1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,762-65 (1972);
Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC. 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,564 (1969); Lamont
v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,482 (1965); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143
(1943); Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
3. Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3265 (1981); Zykan v.
Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist.,
541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25,457 F.2d 289 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615
(D. Vt. 1979); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense Comm.
v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
4. See Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1976).
5. See cases cited in note 3 supra.
6. Three courts have forbidden school boards' removing books from public school libraries: Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269
(D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). Three courts,
however, have permitted books to be banished: Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th
Cir. 1980); President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25,457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 998 (1972); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dir., 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979).
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case judicial weighing of competing interests. Generally, such an approach is
useful when (1) the government interests at stake are constitutionally neutral
and thus judicially weighable; and (2) the need for a sensitive consideration of
the merits of each case outweighs the need for a precedential rule' When
these ad hoc requisites are not apparent, however, a second form of first
amendment analysis, definitional balancing, is appropriate? A definitional
approach uses balancing, not to ascertain the relative worth of a speech or
governmental interest in a particular case, but to determine if a given expres-
sion is within a definitional base and, thus, protected speech under the first
amendment. In contrast to the case-by-case transience of the ad hoc ap-
proach, definitional balancing produces a rule that defines the scope or sets
the standard of first amendment freedoms.'" Definitional balancing is properly
employed when (I) government regulation of expression is content based; and
(2) the need for a precedentially certain rule outweighs any loss in analytical
sensitivity."
This Comment will first explore the distinct factual circumstances in
which ad hoc and definitional balancing are properly used. It will then be
shown why the current application of ad hoc balancing to school book cases
poses a significant threat to students' first amendment freedom. An alterna-
tive definitional approach to the first amendment rights of secondary school
students will then be examined. Finally, this Comment will analyze the ad-
vantages of the definitional approach and the constitutional grounds support-
ing its adoption.
II. BALANCING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Ad Hoc Balancing
It is well settled that first amendment freedoms are not absolute.'2 In
many circumstances, expression or expressive acts may be subject to
government regulation. 3 To determine the point at which a government in-
terest bears sufficient importance to justify regulation of first amendment
freedoms, courts have often applied an ad hoc balancing test.4
In the first amendment context ad hoc balancing weighs the government
interest in regulating expressive activities with the consequent infringement
on an individual's first amendment freedoms. United States v. O'Brien5 pro-
7. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 912-14 (1963);
Nimmer, The Right To Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied To Libel And Misapplied
to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 938-47 (1968).
8. See generally Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975).
9. Nimmer, supra note 7, at 943-45.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
13. Id.
14. Nimmer, supra note 7, at 943-45.
15. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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vides a prominent example of first amendment ad hoc balancing. 6 O'Brien
burnt his draft card on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse and was
convicted for violating a federal statute that made it a criminal offense to
knowingly mutilate or destroy a selective service certificate. O'Brien argued
that the federal statute was unconstitutional as applied because it restricted
his first amendment freedom of expression. 8 The Court agreed that the
"communicative elements" of O'Brien's expression were "sufficient to bring
into play the First Amendment.'" 9 The Court ruled, however, that the
government's interest in maintaining the selective service system was of suf-
ficient importance to justify the incidental restriction on O'Brien's free ex-
pression.
-2 0
In O'Brien the Supreme Court outlined the requisite standards for first
amendment ad hoc balancing:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified... [1] if it
furthers an important or substantial government interest; [2] if the government
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [3] if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest. 2'
The Supreme Court's use of the ad hoc approach in O'Brien was predicated
on the determination that the federal statute involved was "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression., 22 The court reasoned that "when 'speech'
and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech ele-
ment can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. "23 In
O'Brien the Court balanced the nonspeech interest of the government (main-
tenance of the selective service system) with the extent to which O'Brien's
speech interest (protesting the Vietnam War) was impaired by the regulation.
The ad hoc approach is particularly useful when the focus of regulation is
on the nonspeech elements of expressive conduct.24 Nonspeech elements
reflect government objectives that are constitutionally neutral and, therefore,
unrelated to the message or content of an expression. In O'Brien the govern-
ment was not regulating the speech aspects of draft card burning, but was
protecting its constitutionally neutral nonspeech interest in maintaining the
selective service system.! The usefulness of ad hoc balancing is contingent
upon the existence of a neutral government objective that can be constitu-
16. Id. at 377.
17. 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(b)(3) (1976).
18. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 386.
21. Id. at 377.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 376.
24. Ely, supra note 8, at 1496.
25. For a critique of the Supreme Court's analysis in O'Brien, see T. FMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 84 (1970).
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tionally weighed against the first amendment interest in free speech. When,
however, the government interest in regulation is focused on the speech ele-
ments of expression and is, thus, related to the suppression of free expres-
sion, the ad hoc approach is unworkable because there exists no neutral
government interest to weigh in the balance.
26
B. Definitional Balancing
When government regulation is focused on the content or communicative
impact of expression, definitional balancing is the proper means of first
amendment analysis 27 Obscenity regulation is an area of content based con-
trol of expressive activities in which the definitional approach has been used.
In Miller v. California28 the Supreme Court set definitional standards for local
regulation of obscenity:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest ... ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.29
The definitional standard enunciated in Miller is a starting point for first
amendment analysis of content based regulation. Expression that falls under
the definitional proscription is excluded from first amendment protection.
Expression outside the definition, however, receives first amendment protec-
tion subject to a balancing with government interests based not on content per
se but on secondary effects and circumstances.3
Miller and O'Brien represent two distinct forms of first amendment an-
alysis. It is, therefore, important to consider the reasons for preferring the
definitional approach over the ad hoc approach when government regulation
is focused on the speech, as opposed to the nonspeech, elements of expres-
sion.3'
C. Definitional Versus Ad Hoc Balancing
When government seeks to suppress ideas or information it considers
dangerous to society, there exists no neutral objective to balance against free
26. Ely, supra note 8, at 1501.
27. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (libel); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words).
28. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
29. Id. at 24
30. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), a Detroit zoning ordinance prohibited
"'adult" establishments from locating within 1000 feet of each other or within 500 feet of a residential zone. The
materials purveyed by these establishments were not legally obscene, yet the regulation was upheld over the
free speech claims of the owners. In sustaining the ordinance, Justice Stevens argued that such regulation did
not "violate the government's paramount obligation of neutralty" since it did not regulate "point of view" but
instead was focused entirely on the deleterious secondary effects that concentrations of these establishments
had on neighborhoods. Id. at 63.
31. Nimmer, supra note 7, at 938.
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speech interests. Thus, if a court applies ad hoc balancing to content based
regulation, there exists no guidance as to the weight that should be afforded
the governmental, as compared to the free speech, interest. The weight a
court does assign to the government interest, therefore, is left largely to
judicial predilection.32 Further, since the ad hoc approach, by its nature,
produces no rule to guide future decisions,33 courts are unable to rely on
previous adjudications as guiding principles. This combination leaves courts
unguided and unrestrained in their decision making.34 For individuals who
wish to engage in expressive activities, the absence of a neutral government
interest against which they may weigh their proposed conduct, coupled with
the lack of precedential guidance, results in uncertainty as to the protection
the first amendment will provide for their conduct. Uncertainty is particularly
pernicious when first amendment rights are at stake, for it tends to chill both
protected and unprotected expression.
35
To foster certainty and thereby overcome the chilling effect of the ad hoc
approach, the Supreme Court has turned to definitional balancing.36 The defi-
nitional rule adopted in Miller lessens the chill on expressive freedoms by
providing a standard that parties and courts can use to demarcate protected
from unprotected expression. For individuals who desire to disseminate
materials that border on legal obscenity, the definitional rule adopted in Miller
sets a standard by which they can gauge their activities to avoid conflict with
the government's interest in regulation. Similarly, for government, the same
definitional rule marks the point at which it may regulate individuals' expres-
sive activities without fear of impinging upon constitutional freedoms. Thus,
the definitional approach provides a measure of certainty for both expressive
and governmental interests. More important than the certainty provided to
these two interests, however, is the guidance the definitional rule provides
courts.
37
In refusing to apply the ad hoc approach to libel cases, the Supreme
Court has argued that its use "lead[s] to unpredictable results and uncertain
expectations.- 38 These uncertain expectations are largely a result of the un-
constrained judicial latitude that results when ad hoc balancing is applied to
content based regulation. In that context ad hoc analysis is unbounded by
interest weighing or precedential rules, and, thus, more room exists in the
analysis for judges to insert their own prejudices. In contrast, it is much less
likely that basic freedoms will be derogated by the political predilections of a
majoritarian judge when decision making is delimited by a definitional rule
32. Ely, supra note 8, at 1497-1502.
33. Nimmer, supra note 7, at 938.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 939.
36. Id. at 944; Ely, supra note 8, at 1497.
37. Nimmer, supra note 7, at 945.
38. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
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that delineates the scope of first amendment protection. 9 To be sure, there
still will be a measure of uncertainty as to how the definitional rule will be
interpreted by a court in a specific case. This uncertainty does not detract,
however, from the incremental certainty that the definition supplies, for in the
sensitive realm of first amendment rights every additional degree of certainty
wards off a degree of chill on the exercise of those rights.'
When first amendment rights are at issue, the proper analytical method,
be it definitional or ad hoc balancing, is determined by the focus of the
government regulation involved.4 1 In school book cases courts have opted
universally for the ad hoc approach. To determine the propriety of this deci-
sion, the basis for the school board's removal of books must be examined.42
III. SCHOOL BOOK BALANCING
A. Application of the Ad Hoc Balancing Test to School Book Controversies
The school library cases litigated in the federal courts possess a number
of striking factual parallels. Typically, school book controversies begin when
parents' groups object to the presence of certain books in the school library.43
These objections commonly are occasioned by a distaste for the social or
political message conveyed by the books." Generally, courts have held that
the contested books possess literary value and are not obscene 45 In succumb-
ing to parental pressure to remove objectionable books from public school
libraries, school boards have triggered first amendment right-to-know law-
suits seeking the return of the contested books '4
The apparent factual similarities of these cases has had little effect on
their resolution. The decisions extend from a dismissal for failure to state a
claim47 to a court order requiring the school board to replace proscribed
39. Ely, supra note 8, at 1501.
40. Nimmer, supra note 7, at 939.
41. Ely, supra note 8. at 1486.
42. Id.
43. In Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 410 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3265 (1981),
eleven books were banned by the local school board because a parent group had classified them as "anti-
American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic and just plain filthy." It was later discovered that among the forbidden
books were two Pulitzer prize winners: Bernard Malamud's The Fixer and Oliver La Farge's Laughing Boy. See
TIME, January 19, 1981, at 86. Prior to Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir.
1980), the local school board eliminated a "values clarification" class and gave the textbooks to a senior citizens
group who, in a show of support for the board, publicly burned them. See NEWSWEEK, November 10, 1980, at
75.
44. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972). In Keefe
v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361-62 (1st Cir. 1969), a school board, under parental pressure, dismissed a teacher
for using a "dirty" word in the classroom. In reinstating the teacher the First Circuit reasoned, "We do not
question the good faith of the... [school board] in believing that some parents have been offended. With the
greatest of respect to such parents, their sensibilities are not the full measure of what is proper education."
45. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 580 (6th Cir. 1976); Right to Read Defense
Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 714 (D. Mass. 1978).
46. See note 6 supra.
47. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
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books.4 8 The inconsistent determinations in school book cases are a product
of the misplaced use of ad hoc balancing.
The misuse of the ad hoc test is readily apparent when the balancing done
in school book cases is compared with that done in O'Brien!9 In O'Brien the
United States Supreme Court began its analysis by acknowledging the broad
governmental and first amendment interests at stake50 The Court proceeded,
however, to base its ad hoc balancing not on these broad concerns, but on the
specific impact of O'Brien's conduct on the neutral government objective of
maintaining the selective service system. 5  The propriety of the ad hoc ap-
proach in O'Brien was occasioned by the presence of a neutral government
objective that could be weighed against O'Brien's first amendment interests.
Thus, to rationalize the use of the ad hoc balancing in school book cases there
must be a neutral school board interest justifying the removal of books.
Several federal courts using an ad hoc approach to allow the removal of
books have been creative in attempting to find this interest. While some
courts have upheld book removal on grounds of inherent school board author-
ity to control the educational environment, 52 many courts, in an apparent
attempt to avoid first amendment conflict, have searched for objective factors
to warrant the removal of books from public school libraries. In Zykan v.
Warsaw Community School Corp.!3 the Seventh Circuit maintained that it is
irresponsible for a school administrator to allow a book to remain in a school
library when its utility fails to justify its use of "valuable shelf space. '"I The
Second Circuit was equally imaginative in President's Council, District 25 v.
Community School Board No. 25,55 upholding the school board's "winnow-
ing" of the library based on "financial and architectural realities.
5 6
48. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 584 (6th Cir. 1976).
49. See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
50. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
51. Id.
52. See President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25,457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 998 (1972), in which Judge Mulligan maintained that '[i]t would seem clear... that books which
become obsolete or irrelevant or where improperly selected initially, for whatever reason, can be removed by
the same authority which was empowered to make the selection in the first place." Id. at 293 (emphasis
supplied). See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), in which the Supreme Court declared that "[b]y
and large, public education ... is committed to the control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and
cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do
not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values." Id. at 104.
53. 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
54. Id. at 1308.
55. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972).
56. Id. at 293. It should be noted that the existence of an alternate means of access to proscribed books is
not a constitutionally sufficient justification for their removal. In Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541
F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), it was reasoned that "[r]estraint on expression may not generally be justified by the fact
that there may be other times, places or circumstances available for such expression." Id. at 582. In Schneider
v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), the Supreme Court explained that "one is not to have the exercise of his
liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."
Id. at 163. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld access
limitations on adult theaters (ordinance requiring adult establishments to be 1000 feet apart). Justice Stevens
justified the ordinance's content based classification by noting that the near-obscenity regulated was "of a
wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate." Id. at 70. The "lesser
speech" analysis of American Mini Theatres distinguishes that case from the political and social content based
restriction prevalent in school book controversies.
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The facile and unsupportable justifications for book proscriptions ad-
vanced in Zykan and President's Council demonstrate that the circuit courts
that have permitted the removal of books are conspicuously attempting to
avoid addressing the actual motive behind the school boards' actions. The
Sixth Circuit in Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist.,5 7 however, went
directly to the actual moving force behind the local school board's book
proscriptions:
In the absence of any explanation of the Board's action which is neutral in First
Amendment terms, we must conclude that the School Board removed the books
because it found them objectionable in content and because it felt that it had the
power, unfettered by the First Amendment, to censor the school library for sub-
ject matter which the Board members found distasteful.58
The Supreme Court has held that the constitutionality of a school board's
action may be determined by examining the reasons behind it! 9 In Tinker v.
Des Moines School District6° the Supreme Court upheld the right of sec-
ondary school students to wear black arm bands to protest the Vietnam War.
The Court held that, in attempting to restrict the students' expressive con-
duct, the school board had failed to show a constitutionally neutral justifica-
tion: "[C]learly, the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at
least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial
interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permis-
sible. " 6' Applying this analysis to school book controversies, it would appear
that a mere social or political dislike for the content of a book would be
constitutionally insufficient to sustain its removal.62 Yet, several courts have
permitted local authorities to purge public school libraries on just such a
basis.
It is extremely doubtful that school boards are removing books because
of their impact on "financial and architectural realities." 63 It could hardly be
argued that the removal of one volume of Catch-22 would solve a shelf space
problem.64 School boards are removing books because of a social or political
distaste for their message. 65 The ad hoc balancing test is being used by courts
as a subterfuge to conceal the suppression of controversial ideas. Such con-
tent based regulation has long been the prime target of the first amendment.66
57. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
58. Id. at 582.
59. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
60. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
61. Id. at 511.
62. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 530 (1980), in which the Supreme
Court reversed a New York Court of Appeals ruling on first amendment free speech grounds that had prohibited
Consolidated Edison from enclosing controversial pro-nuclear power inserts with monthly electric bills.
63. President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
64. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
65. President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1972).
66. In Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), the Supreme Court struck down a Chicago ordinance
which prohibited picketing near a school but excepted peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor
dispute. Justice Marshall's opinion focused on the content based nature of the ordinance: "[Government] may
not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities." Id. at 95-96.
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The Supreme Court has held that "above all else the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrain expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter or its content.- 67
When regulation of expression is content based, ad hoc balancing cannot
adequately protect first amendment freedoms.6 Because courts cannot con-
stitutionally balance the political or social content of a book, there has, in
school book cases, been no neutral government objective to weigh against
student first amendment freedoms. Thus, the relative value a court attaches to
the school board's, as compared to the students', interests is dependent
largely upon the prejudices of the court. It is true that school book ad hoc
balancing has, in some instances, protected the students' first amendment
right to know.69 In a substantial number of cases, however, the ad hoc ap-
proach has facilitated a virtual disregard of student rights 70 Content based ad
hoc balancing licenses ad hoc devaluation of the principles underlying first
amendment freedoms.7' In a Second Circuit school book case, Pico v. Board
of Education,' the concurring judge reasoned that
[t]he symbolic effect of a school's action in removing a book solely because of its
ideas will often be more significant than the resulting limitation upon access to it.
The fact that the book barred from the school library may be available elsewhere is
not decisive. What is significant is that the school has used its public power to
perform an act clearly indicating that the views represented by the forbidden book
are unacceptable. The impact of burning a book does not depend on whether every
copy is on the fire. Removing a book from a school library is a less offensive act,
but it can also pose a substantial threat of suppression. 73
If a student's right to know is to depend on more than the existence of
amicable courts, then the judicial latitude inherent in content based ad hoc
balancing must be constrained by a definitional rule that clearly demarcates
students' first amendment freedoms.
B. A Definitional Approach to School Book Controversies
By providing flexibility and certainty, the definitional approach estab-
lishes a framework for the exercise of both the school board's educational
discretion and the students' right to know.74 The definitional rule adopted in
67. Id. at 95.
68. Ely, supra note 8. at 1497-1502.
69. See note 6 supra.
70. Id.
71. See text accompanying notes 79-91 supra.
72. 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3265 (1981).
73. Id. at 434 (Newman, J., concurring). See also Nimmer, supra note 7, at 939. In the educational context
the counterpart of the students' right to know is the teachers' first amendment right to academic freedom. It is
unlikely that this right will remain unaffected by the chill created when books are officially disapproved. See
Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969) (teacher may not be discharged for the educational use of a
"dirty" word in the classroom); Parducci v Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (teacher dismissal for
assignment of a short story overturned in the absence of showing by school officials that it was educationally
inappropriate).
74. See generally Nimmer, supra note 7.
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Miller set a flexible standard that left local communities free to regulate ob-
scenity at any point below a threshold minimum. This rule focuses on the
point at which a local community has a constitutionally neutral objective to
justify restricting expressive freedoms. At this point, regulation is based, not
on content per se, but upon secondary effects and circumstances.75 Similarly,
in school book controversies, the application of definitional balancing must
focus on a neutral school board rationale to justify the removal of books from
public school libraries and the consequent infringement of the students' right
to know.
Since a school's ultimate function is to educate its students, the defini-
tional guidelines for the removal of school books must be based upon the
educational qualities of a contested volume. In secondary schools, therefore,
the preservation of a meaningful first amendment right to know is contingent
upon the unfettered availability of books possessing educational value. Under
the definitional approach proposed here a publication would possess educa-
tional value if, taken as a whole, it provided opportunity for an individual's
adjustment to his or her environment through the fostering of social, cultural,
political, economic, or scientific growth.
This definition is not, in the traditional sense of Miller, an exclusionary
rule. Rather, it sets the scales on which a proper first amendment balance is
struck. The proper analytical scales are those which mandate consideration of
the values inherent in first amendment freedoms.!6 The "educational value"
rule affirms the presumptive constitutionality which content based ad hoc
balancing often denies. The standard set by the rule is necessarily high be-
cause school book exclusion is antagonistic to political speech, a core area in
the first amendment's hierarchy of values.77
In a given school book case, the trier of fact would use the "educational
value" rule as a base to determine whether a book's presence in the library
was consistent with students' educational imperatives. The rule is a threshold
standard, establishing high level first amendment protection to all books
possessing educational value. Its imposition, however, does not diffuse the
board's discretionary authority to guide the educational process.
The definition espoused above focuses on both the educational attributes
of a contested book and the ability of students to understand and learn from it.
One court has reasoned that as a "student advances in age, experience,
information, and skills, the need for controlling the educational environment
diminishes." 78 In operating within the definitional constraint, a school board
would be empowered to take the above factors into account to determine the
composition of the library. Thus, the educational value rule allows consider-
able local discretion in determining the educational exposure students receive
75. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 79-91 infra.
77. Id.
78. Cary v. Board of Educ., 427 F. Supp. 945, 953 (D. Colo. 1977).
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through the school library. In addition to providing flexibility for local
school boards, the definitional approach furnishes students with a right to
know grounded in certainty.
The definitional rule establishes library access rights and facilitates stu-
dent action when local authorities go too far in attempting to limit exposure to
controversial materials. Moreover, the very existence of a rule, as opposed to
a line of amorphous balancings, makes it more likely that school boards will
respect student rights in determining library resources. Beyond the rule itself,
student certainty is promoted by the consistent judicial decision making that
mandatory guidelines engender.
In contrast to the unbridled judicial latitude that inheres in content based
ad hoc balancing, the definitional approach limits court discretion by man-
dating adherence to a rule. The rule provides the court with guidance in
determining the limits of a school board's power to remove books. Further, as
courts are obliged to balance the interests only within the confines of the rule,
it is less likely that judicial prejudice will be the determinative factor in a
school book decision. The result of additional guidance and less prejudicial
influence will be consistent decision making by different courts and in dif-
ferent cases. Consistent adjudications will compound the certainty inherent in
the rule.
In school book cases the content based nature of the school boards'
regulation mandates the use of the definitional approach. Admittedly the edu-
cational value rule will preclude the removal of many contested books. There
is, however, strong constitutional support for the educational diversity that
the rule engenders.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE DEFINITIONAL APPROACH-THE
EDUCATIONAL MARKETPLACE CONCEPT
At the foundation of the first amendment's system of expression is the
concept of a "marketplace of ideas": "[The best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." 79 The
existence of the educational marketplace is dependent upon a balanced pre-
sentation of ideas, not domination by a single political or social viewpoint.
The educational marketplace concept has drawn support from a wide range of
commentators and courts. Professor Thomas Emerson has reasoned:
Ultimately any system of freedom of expression depends upon the existence of an
educated, independent, mature citizenry. Consequently realization of the ob-
jectives of the First Amendment requires educational institutions that produce
graduates who are trained in handling ideas, judging facts and argument, thinking
79. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Red Lion Broad-
casting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1%9), in which the Supreme Court explained: "'It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.... It is the
right ... to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ... experiences which is
crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged ..... *Id. at 390.
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independently, and generally participating effectively in the marketplace of ideas.
Hence the First Amendment could be said to require ... educational institutions
that are capable of producing such results. 80
Providing additional support for this doctrine is a long line of Supreme
Court decisions that reflect the necessity of an educational marketplace. In
Meyer v. Nebraska8 the Supreme Court struck down a state statute that
prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to students under ninth grade.
Writing for the majority, Justice McReynolds found it "easy to appreciate"
the desire of the legislature to foster homogeneous American ideals, " The
Court held, however, that there was no state interest sufficient to justify the
"consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed." '83 The first amend-
ment interest in a broad educational exposure received further support in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.84 In Barnette the Su-
preme Court held a mandatory flag salute statute unconstitutional. Justice
Jackson elucidated the role of the first amendment in education:
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought es-
sential to their time and country have been waged by many good as well as by evil
men.... As first and moderate methods to attain unity have failed, those bent on
its accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. As governmental
pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more bitter as to whose
unity it will be.... Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find
themselves exterminating dissenters.85
In light of this concem, he addressed the role of education: "[T]hat (schools)
are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional Freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
goverment as mere platitudes." 86
Justice Jackson's Barnette opinion was later quoted approvingly and
expanded upon by Justice Fortas in Tinker, in which it was explained that
"[iun our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of
only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined
to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved."
87
80. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 613 (1970).
81. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
82. Id. at 402.
83. Id. at 403.
84. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
85. Id. at 640-41.
86. Id. at 637. See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), in which the Supreme Court maintained,
"The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools." Id. at 487.
87. 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). See also Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Sixth
Circuit in Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976), found the removal of
books to be a "much more serious burden upon freedom of classroom discussion than the action found
unconstitutional in Tinker...." In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967), the Supreme Court
explained, "Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value
to all of us.... That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom .... The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of
ideas."'
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Finally, in school book cases themselves, substantial support can be
found for the educational marketplace. In Minarcini, where book banning was
disallowed, the Sixth Circuit explained that "a library is a mighty resource in
the free marketplace of ideas," and therefore once the state or school board
grants a library privilege to students, no conditions that relate "solely to the
social or political tastes of school board members" could be placed on the use
of that privilege. n Surprisingly, substantial support for the educational mar-
ketplace can be found in Zykan, the Seventh Circuit case that permitted the
school board to remove disputed books. "To be sure," commented Judge
Cummings, "the discretion lodged in local school boards is not completely
unfettered by constitutional considerations. ' s9 The Constitution does not
permit "rigid and exclusive indoctrination"'9 nor does it allow "a purge of all
material offensive to single, exclusive perception of the way of the world." 9'
These cases provide strong constitutional support for the notion that the
right to know mandates broad educational exposure. The definitional ap-
proach ensures such exposure by providing students with an educational
marketplace in which to exercise their freedoms.
V. CONCLUSION
In adjudicating school book cases courts have improperly relied on the ad
hoc balancing test. Those courts that have permitted local authorities to re-
move books from public school libraries have often used the ad hoc approach
to conceal content based regulation of expression. The right to know is of
little value if courts are free to balance away that right absent a counter-
vailing, constitutionally neutral school board interest. The content based
focus of school book ad hoc balancing leaves students unsure of their rights
and courts unrestrained to reach any desired conclusion.
In public schools, a student's first amendment right to know is realized
by the existence of an educational marketplace. The Supreme Court has
concluded: "The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a
multitude of tongues' [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selec-
tion. -92 By providing certainty and constraining judicial latitude, the defini-
tional approach ensures students the opportunity to engage in the robust
exchange of the marketplace.
James C. Lemay
88. 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976).
89. 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 1980).
90. Id. at 1306.
91. Id. at 1308.
92. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52
F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (brackets in original)).
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